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them.I. Introduction
The 1980s have commonly been labelled the lost decade for deve-
loping countries. High foreign indebtedness has been blamed for
economic stagnation and decline of Latin American countries in
particular. The dismal picture is sometimes projected into the
future. Given the fiercer worldwide competition for foreign capi-
tal, it is feared that Latin America's position in international
capital markets may be further eroded in the 1990s.
As argued in the following, such an undifferentiated assessment
neither held for the past, nor does it provide a reasonable fore-
cast for the rest of this century. Significant differences be-
tween individual countries are evident. After the outbreak of the
debt crisis in 1982, real GDP growth per annum more than doubled
the Latin American average (1983-1991: 1.9 per cent) in Chile
(4.6 per cent) and Colombia (4 per cent) [ECLAC, 1991, p. 37]. By
contrast, economic growth was considerably below average in Mexi-
co (1.4 per cent) and even more so in Argentina (0.6 per cent) .
The private investment ratio recovered most impressively in Chile
in the 1985-1990 period (by 129 per cent), whereas this ratio
decreased by 41 and 53 per cent in Argentina and Venezuela re-
spectively [Pfeffermann, Madarassy, 1992, p. 4].
The economic policies of debtor countries were of major im-
portance as concerns the degree and speed by which debt problems
could be alleviated. The future attractiveness for foreign capi-
tal is also likely to depend on internal reform efforts in the
first place. This proposition is discussed from different angles
in the following. Cross-country estimates on the role of domestic
economic policies with regard to the availability of foreign
capital are summarized in Section II. Section III provides a
short overview on the policy options which heavily indebted coun-
tries faced after the outbreak of the crisis. Section IV analyzes
This represented the highest increase within a sample of 35 de-
veloping countries of various regions.- 2 -
the reform process in selected Latin American countries and its
consequences for capital inflows. The focus is on Argentina,
Brazil, Chile and Mexico, which all belonged to the most heavily
indebted economies in Latin America, but differed remarkably in
their policy reactions to the debt crisis. Section V summarizes
and concludes.
II. Domestic Policies and International Capital Flows: Cross-
country Evidence
The determinants of different types of international capital
flows are not necessarily the same. The subsequent summary of
empirical studies differentiates between debt flows and foreign
direct investment (FDI) in order to reveal similarities and dif-
ferences in the behavior of foreign creditors and investors. The
presentation concentrates on results indicating how credit con-
strained countries, such as the major Latin American debtors, may
contain capital outflows and regain access to international capi-
tal markets.
1. Determinants of International Credltworthiness
Even after the risk illusions of lenders had been destroyed in
the early 1980s, it continued to be heavily debated whether the
access to foreign loans could be encouraged by favorable domestic
policies and good economic performance. Conflicting hypotheses
may apply to different lending regimes. Most importantly, a dis-
tinction has to be drawn between voluntary lending and defensive
2
lending (which is sometimes called "involuntary" lending):
Therefore, lending to non-constrained borrowers is not con-
sidered in the following.
2
Defensive lending is defined according to Watson et al. [1988].
This lending regime comprises countries for which concerted
credit extension, i.e., equiproportional increases in loan
exposure coordinated by bank advisory committees, took place.
The lending to countries without such concerted credit exten-
sion is considered voluntary.- 3 -
- Ample evidence suggests that the borrowers' economic policies
figured prominently in determining whether external debt became
unmanageable in the early 1980s. Hence, better performing
countries should have had easier access to voluntary lending
recently.
- Under conditions of defensive lending, however, favorable poli-
cies and better performance may even lead to reduced, rather
than increased bank lending [Krugman, 1988; 1989]. It may be in
the banks' interest to provide loans "involuntarily" to problem
debtors in order to protect existing claims. According to this
reasoning, the incentive of banks to orchestrate new loans is
weakened if the market valuation of the inherited debt improves
due to policy reforms and better economic performance of the
debtor.
These hypotheses were tested by running separate (pooled cross-
country) regressions for 14 developing countries for which defen-
sive lending was orchestrated in the 1980s and for 12 developing
countries not benefiting from such lending [Nunnenkamp, 1990].
The empirical results strongly contest the notion of bad policies
inducing further lending [see also Lensink, van Bergeijk, 1991].
The estimates rather indicate that private creditors honored
favorable policies by relaxing credit constraints. The access to
international credit markets was improved, e.g., by higher in-
vestment ratios, better world-market performance and real ex-
2
change rate devaluation. This result also held for developing
countries for which defensive lending took place, as was the case
for major debtors in Latin America. This provides a first indica-
tion that it was a losing proposition if Latin American countries
attempted to attract more (defensive) lending by unfavorable
economic policies.
For a discussion of domestic policies with regard to debt pro-
blems, see e.g. Baneth [1986]; Khan and Knight [1983]; Nunnen-
kamp [1986] and Zaidi [1985].
2
The latter result indicates that real exchange rates were over-
valued in many developing countries [Edwards, 1989].- 4 -
Cross-country evidence also indicates, however, that narrowly
defined adjustment programs were an insufficient condition for a
resumption of commercial bank lending. This qualification is
particularly relevant for Latin American economies where sover-
eign risk and credibility problems have become evident since the
early 1980s [El-Erian, 1991].
The estimates support standard sovereign-risk arguments,
according to which rational lenders will consider the borrowers'
incentives to default when deciding on further credit extension
(for an analytical overview, see Eaton, Gersovitz, Stiglitz
[1986]). Voluntary lending was hypothesized to be negatively
related to the benefits to be reaped from defaulting on external
debt, and positively related to the potential costs of such deb-
tor behavior. The evidence on the approximated costs of default
turned out to be inconclusive, which may indicate that the threat
of sanctions by creditors was not credible. However, net trans-
fers were negatively related to the potential benefits of default
[Nunnenkamp, 1990].
The counterhypothesis was clearly rejected, namely that the ex-
pectation of default may induce, rather than prevent further
lending to constrained borrowers once debt-servicing problems
have emerged [Krugman, 1988; Cohen, Sachs, 1986, pp. 539f.].
Defensive loan disbursements did not improve the borrowers'
access to international credit markets in terms of net transfers.
Hence, it was not very promising for Latin America to threaten
with default in order to stimulate further bank lending.
2. Determinants of the Attractiveness for Foreign Direct Invest-
ment
With hardly any new lending forthcoming, expectations were pinned
The borrowers' benefits from default primarily depend on the
contractual debt-service burden [Eaton, Gersovitz, 1981, p.
302]. When considering the default costs, the borrowers have to
take into account the sanctions that may be imposed on them by
the creditors [Sachs, 1984, pp. 17f.].- 5 -
increasingly on FDI to alleviate foreign debt problems. The chan-
ces to induce FDI can only be assessed realistically, however, if
sovereign risk considerations, the impact of political and econo-
mic instability as well as the host country's attitudes towards
FDI are considered as possible determinants in addition to the
traditional set
nenkamp, 1991].
traditional set of explanatory variables [Agarwal, Gubitz, Nun-
Major results from pooled cross-country regressions for the 1980s
that are relevant in a Latin American context can be summarized
as follows. First, foreign investors accounted for risks origina-
ting from difficulties of developing countries to service their
external debt. Under conditions of a debt overhang, foreign in-
vestors refrained from further engagements (for an opposing view,
see Perasso [1992]). The underlying fear was that income from
productive investment may decline due to higher future taxes (in
order to service the inherited debt) [Sachs, 19 89] and stagnating
markets. Consequently, overindebted countries in Latin America
are likely to face difficulties in attracting further FDI unless
debt problems are overcome.
Secondly, the expectation of continued political and economic
instability rendered it more difficult for entrepreneurs to un-
dertake cost-benefit analyses for investment projects. Hence, it
is not surprising that instability clearly reduced the attrac-
tiveness of a country for foreign investors (see also Edwards
[1991]; Schneider, Frey [1985]).
Thirdly, FDI inflows were negatively affected by overly restric-
tive attitudes of host countries towards foreign investors. In
the 1980s, many countries moved towards more liberal ownership
regulations, non-bureaucratic approval procedures and favorable
rules on the repatriation of profits and capital [UNCTC, 19 88].
This trend impaired the attractiveness for FDI of host countries
The latter include: trade relations, the size and the growth of
the host countries' domestic markets, currency valuation, and
labor costs.- 6 -
that maintained relatively strict regulations (for the case of
Brazil, see Funke, Nunnenkamp, Schweickert [1992]). Moreover,
sovereign risk considerations influenced the behavior of foreign
investors in relatively restrictive countries. Potential benefits
from expropriations - proxied by the ratio of FDI stocks over GDP
- discouraged further inflows to such countries [Agarwal, Gubitz,
Nunnenkamp, 1991]. By contrast, high FDI stocks induced even more
flows to countries with favorable attitudes towards FDI. The
latter result indicates that a liberal treatment of FDI and a co-
operative stance of host countries towards foreign investors help
to enhance the attractiveness for FDI through reputation
building.
Furthermore, government interventions in goods and factor markets
hindered the inflow of risk capital [Hiemenz, Nunnenkamp et al.,
1991]:
- Discriminatory taxes and subsidies, administrative price
fixing, and similar measures interfered with the relative
profitability of production among sectors. Empirical evidence
also suggests that excessive trade interventions induced an
inefficient use of resources, which ultimately undermined a
country's position in the international competition for risk
capital (see also Krueger [1990, Part III]). This result chal-
lenges the widespread belief that import protection is a
promising means to attract FDI.
- A country's competitive position in international capital mar-
kets was further affected by unfavorable capital and labor
market conditions. Financial repression characterized by low or
even negative real interest rates discoraged domestic savings
and the transmission of savings into loanable funds. Complemen-
tary domestic capital required to attract FDI remained insuf-
ficient. Notwithstanding relatively low unit-labor costs, a
country was unlikely to become an attractive investment loca-
tion if a particularly poor endowment with human capital was a
binding constraint for economic development, or ineffective- 7 -
collective bargaining arrangements led to excessive labor mar-
ket disputes.
All in all, foreign investors responded to restrictive regula-
tions, policy induced distortions and transfer risks in a similar
way as did foreign lenders. Parallel behavior of capital
suppliers has as a consequence that the chances of debt-ridden
Latin American countries to restructure their external financing
are limited at best unless the attractiveness for both types of
foreign finance is restored.
III. Debt Strategies of Major Debtors in Latin America
The cross-country evidence presented so far supports the propo-
sition that the attractiveness of developing countries for for-
eign capital critically depends on their own economic policies.
Locational advantages were enhanced if macroeconomic instability
and government interference into goods and factor markets were
kept to a minimum. A cooperative stance vis-a-vis foreign capital
suppliers signaled the government's willingness to contain sover-
eign risk and added to its credibility. However, it may prove
difficult to regain access to international capital markets once
the creditworthiness of debtor countries and the credibility of
governments have been seriously eroded, as was the case for major
Latin American countries.
Governments in Latin America faced a critical choice after the
sudden reversal of international capital flows in the early
1980s. The chances to contain capital outflows in the short run
and the longer-term consequences on the attractiveness for for-
eign capital were of utmost importance in deciding on the appro-
In 1980, Latin America received net transfers (including aid,
commercial credits and foreign direct investment) of US$ 7.2
billion. By contrast, annual outflows in the order of US$ 15-21
billion were recorded in the 1984-1989 period. Subsequently
capital outflows decreased, but still remained significant
(1990: US$ 6.3 billion; 1991: US$ 8.6 billion) [World Bank,
1991a].- 8 -
priate debt strategy. None of the major Latin American debtor
countries grasped the most radical option, i.e., outright debt
repudiation. It was feared that this strategy would have resulted
in persistent isolation from international capital markets and
the discontinuation of multilateral financial assistance.
The majority of countries rather followed a muddling-through
approach which was characterized by partial default, temporary
and unilateral debt-service moratoria, and protracted debt rene-
gotiations with foreign creditors. Initially, a thorough review
of misguided economic policies to tackle the internal causes of
payment problems figured low on the agenda.
Brazil represents the most telling example of a non-cooperative
debt strategy [Funke, Nunnenkamp, Schweickert, 1992]. Within two
years (1983-1984), the government submitted seven letters of in-
tent to the IMF. The result were two waivers, three modifications
of targets, and two suspensions [Cardoso, Fishlow, 1989, p. 84].
Negotiations with the IMF broke down in late 1985, and Brazil
declared a moratorium on interest payments to commercial banks in
early 1987. Resumed IMF negotiations were again suspended in 1989,
because of the government's failure to meet the targets on public
sector deficits. Throughout the 1980s, frequent stabilization
episodes were bound to fail because they were not based on sus-
tainable fiscal consolidation. Interventionist government poli-
cies in goods and factor markets continued, e.g., in the form of
price controls, bureaucratic control over imports and export
2
permits, highly selective access of enterprises to credit faci-
lities, and labor market regulations [Carneiro, Werneck, 1989].
An agreement on soaring interest arrears (end-1990: US$ 9.6
billion; World Bank [1991a]) with commercial banks was achieved
in May 1991, which was again followed by negotiations with the
IMF. In mid-1992, it was principally agreed to restructure a
major portion of Brazilian bank debt on a longer-term basis
under the umbrella of the Brady Plan [Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, 7 July 1992].
2
Since the late 1980s, import restrictions have been libera-
lized. Most importantly, the extensive system of discretionary
non-tariff barriers has been tackled [EIU, a].- 9 -
Similar to Brazil, Argentina did not adjust appropriately to the
debt crisis, but rather accommodated the disappearance of capital
inflows by printing money and creating domestic debt [Hiemenz,
Nunnenkamp et al., 1991, pp. 119ff.; de Pablo, 1990]. Five stabi-
lization plans failed during 1983-1989, largely because of insuf-
ficient adjustment in the public sector. Due to the lack of
structural reforms, the private sector remained highly distorted.
After having received bridge loans in 1983, the debt situation of
Argentina continued to be unsustainable. The country began debt
rescheduling at a substantial scale in 1985, and various rounds
of rescheduling took place in the subsequent years [World Bank,
1991a, Vol. 1, pp. 73ff.]. It was only in March 1991 that the
government seriously attempted to restore its credibility [EIU,
b, 1991, No. 2]. The convertibility of the domestic currency was
guaranteed at a fixed rate to the US-dollar. It was announced
that the monetary base would be backed entirely by dollar and
gold reserves. This commitment was accompanied with numerous
structural measures, including de-indexation of wages and prices,
privatization, and import liberalization.
Mexico changed course much earlier than Argentina. Supported by
the international community, the Mexican government implemented a
growth-oriented adjustment program in 1987, which yielded con-
siderable progress in trade liberalization, privatization of
state enterprises and monetary control [Aspe, 1992]. The policy
reforms strengthened the tax base, reduced public sector defi-
cits, and encouraged non-traditional exports. Previously, Mexico
(the first large debtor country that defaulted in August 1982)
represented another example of the prefered muddling-through
approach. Various debt reschedulings and myopic adjustment
measures, including import compression, were ingredients of this
strategy. In the early 1980s, Mexico was a classical case of
public overspending [Kaufman, 1990, p. 95]. First attempts at
macroeconomic stabilization remained futile and basically re-
stricted to cutting public investment.- 10 -
Underlying the widespread muddling-through approach was the
agreement among most Latin American policy-makers that if they
had to choose between servicing the external debt and domestic
economic growth, they would choose to grow. It is extremely
doubtful whether there was such a simple choice. Foreign capital
continued to be required to fully exhaust Latin America's growth
potential. Ceteris paribus, any unilaterally decreed or enforced
reduction of debt-service payments saves the debtor country re-
sources which could be invested productively. However, the
second-round effects of this option on total investment funds may
not be too different from outright debt repudiation:
- Capital outflows from Latin America were due to dramatically
reduced credit disbursements, rather than a higher debt-service
burden. This indicates that resources retained through partial
default may be overcompensated by forgone inflows of new
credits.
- The cross-country evidence presented in Section II suggests
that the adverse effects of non-cooperative debt policies are
not confined to Latin America's relations with international
bank creditors. Also foreign investment might be discouraged by
persistent debtor-creditor confrontation.
- Under unfavorable economic policy conditions, resources re-
tained through partial default may be used for consumption or
fuel capital flight, rather than being invested productively.
Among the countries considered here, it was only Chile which
attempted to avoid the drawbacks of non-cooperative debt policies
from the beginning. This country followed a strategy based on the
Debt-service payments of Latin America were roughly the same in
1980 and 1985 (US$ 30 billion). At the same time, credit dis-
bursements dwindled from US$ 33 billion to US$ 8.7 billion,
resulting in the reversal of net transfers (out of bank loans)
from US$ 2.8 billion to US$ -21 billion [Funke, Nunnenkamp,
Schweickert, 1992, p. 4]. The picture for 1985 did not change
significantly until the late 1980s.- 11 -
expectation that sustained internal adjustment efforts would be
supported by voluntary and market-based debt concessions by the
creditors. Chile implemented major reforms in the 1970s already.
State enterprises were privatized, prices decontrolled, large
fiscal deficits abolished, trade and financial markets libera-
lized. Nevertheless, the debt shock of the early 1980s hit Chile
as well. In contrast to other Latin American countries, however,
the Chilean government timely subscribed to IMF standby programs
in order to remain current on external debt service. This "no-
confrontation principle" [Meller, 1990, p. 69] went hand in hand
with serious adjustment efforts, e.g., tight fiscal and monetary
policies, export-enhancing devaluation, and wage de-indexation.
Sustained adjustment to the debt crisis was considered by the
Chilean government to be an investment in the country's reputa-
tion in international capital markets. It helped the agreement
with commercial creditors on a menu of market-based debt and
debt-service reduction operations. In this way, Chile's total
bank debt was reduced by more than half within four years, from
US$ 14.5 billion in 1985 to US$ 6.7 billion in 1990 [El-Erian,
1991, p. 5].
2
Nevertheless, it continued to be debated whether the perceptions
of country risk could be lowered by a cooperative debt strategy.
Especially commercial banks have been blamed to "have provided
words of praise but no access to medium-run voluntary credit"
[Meller, 1990, p. 84]. The question remains whether the timely
adjustment in Chile, the later change from non-cooperative to
cooperative debt policies in Mexico and the most recent reform
efforts in Argentina were worth their costs. This question is
addressed in two respects in the following. First, the effects of
different debt strategies on the countries' competitive position
This menu included debt-equity conversions, direct cash buy-
backs, conversions of debt into collateralized discount bonds,
reduced interest par bonds, etc.
2
Direct cash buybacks in 1988/89 extinguished US$ 440 million of
bank debt at a cost of US$ 250 million, involving an average
discount of 43.5 per cent.- 12 -
in international capital markets are evaluated by refering to
major elements of the "attractiveness portfolio" as revealed by
the cross-country studies presented in Section II. Secondly, it
is assessed whether adjustment efforts have resulted in a better
access to foreign financing recently.
IV. Consequences of Domestic Policies and Debt Strategies
1. The "Attractiveness Portfolio" of Major Latin American
Debtors
According to the results reported in Section II, the attractive-
ness of a country for foreign capital critically depends on ma-
croeconomic stability, overall economic performance, the level of
government interference into goods and factor markets, and sover-
eign risk perceptions. For some of these areas, it is relatively
straightforward to construct meaningful indicators. In other
respects, this proves fairly difficult especially if cross-coun-
try information is required for the very recent past. Because of
data limitations the subsequent discussion focuses on selected
indicators of economic performance and stability, and some
proxies reflecting the risk perceptions of foreign capital sup-
pliers . The evidence on government encroachment on private econo-
mic activities is particularly deficient.
Notwithstanding these limitations, Table 1 presents fairly strong
evidence supporting the proposition that internal adjustment
efforts help to enhance and restore the country's attractiveness
for foreign capital. In nearly all respects, Chile as the country
with the longest reform history clearly outperforms its neigh-
boring countries. Mexico which changed course relatively early
ranks second. By contrast, the most unfavorable "attractiveness
portfolio" is recorded for Brazil, i.e., the country most re-
luctant to abandon the traditional muddling-through approach.
On conceptual questions and data constraints in analyzing goods
and factor market distortions, see Hiemenz, Nunnenkamp et al.
[1991] .Bibiiothek
des Instituts fur Weltwirtschafc
- 13 -
Table 1 - Major Elements of the "Attractiveness Portfolio" of
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Period average. - Comparable data for Brazil not available. - Consumer
prices. - Surplus indicated by positive figures. - Deposit rates deflated
by consumer price indices; calculation results in extremely implausible rer
sults for Argentina and Brazil. - M2 in per cent of GDP. - ^ 1986-87. -
Index of national currency in terms of the basket of currencies of the coun-
try's main trading partners (weighted by the share of partner countries in
national exports); deflated by wholesale price indices. - In per cent of
face value of loans; 1986: annual average; 1987-1991: fourth quarter; 1992:
second quarter.
Source: IMF [a]; ECLAC [1991]; Pfeffennann, Madarassy [1992]; World Bank
[1991a; 1991b; 1992], Funke, Nunnenkamp, Schweickert [1992].- 15 -
Economic performance; The impressive growth and investment record
of Chile has been mentioned in the introduction already. More
interestingly, economic growth picked up in Mexico and Argentina
after economic reforms had been introduced, whereas it proved
unsustainable in Brazil where the 1980s were characterized by
several short-lived consumption booms. Economic recovery of Mexi-
co is also revealed by the rising private investment ratio. The
favorable investment response provides a clear indication that
the reform program of 1987 was considered credible and sustain-
able by economic agents.
Chile occupies the top position with regard to world market per-
formance as well. All other sample countries lost export market
shares during the 1980s. The decline was similarly strong for
Brazil and Mexico when comparing 1991 with 1983-85. However, such
a comparison conceals important differences. Brazil experienced a
steady decline of market shares. By contrast, the sudden drop of
Mexico's market share in 1986 was mainly due to depressed oil
prices. Subsequently, market shares remained stable. A more
favorable world market performance was prevented by the real
appreciation of the Mexican peso since the late 1980s. This
points to serious risks of applying fixed exchange rates as an
anchor in stabilization programs [see also Corbo, 1992].
Macroeconomic stability; Chile has been characterized by sus-
tained macroeconomic stability since the mid-1970s. Inflation
rates and budget deficits have been exceptionally low by Latin
American standards. Since the late 1980s, the same applies to
Mexico. The reform program resulted in impressive fiscal consoli-
dation which, in turn, helped to contain inflation. Although the
more recent stabilization program in Argentina was initiated
under extreme, i.e., hyper-inflationary conditions, success is
looming in overcoming the tradition of pronounced macroeconomic
instability. Again, it is the country least prone to comprehen-
sive and consistent policy adjustment which represents the tail-
light in terms of attractiveness. Notwithstanding periodic price
freezes and controls, Brazil continues to suffer from excessive- 16 -
and volatile inflation fuelled by extremely high fiscal defi-
cits. Furthermore, high volatility of the real exchange rate
creates considerable uncertainty with respect to both external
trade and capital flows. Recent evidence suggests increased
rather than reduced exchange rate fluctuation in Brazil [EIU, a].
Domestic financial markets: Extremely high and volatile inflation
seriously impaired the functioning of financial markets in Argen-
tina and Brazil. Real interest rates can not reasonably be calcu-
lated for these countries. Nevertheless, it can safely be conclu-
ded that erratic financial market conditions prevailed throughout
the period under consideration. The inflationary environment
contributed to the demonetization of these economies. Financial
deepening, proxied by broad money supply relative to GDP, was
found to be particularly poor in Brazil. Not surprisingly, Chile
represented the antipole again. Financial deepening was signifi-
cantly more advanced, and real interest rates were moderately
positive. For Mexico, there is some evidence that economic re-
forms helped to overcome financial repression.
Openness of domestic goods markets; Information on subsidies,
discriminatory taxes, effective rates of protection, etc. would
be required to correctly assess the degree of government inter-
ventions in goods markets. If at all, such data are not available
on a current basis. Even the rather crude indicator of the degree
of openness to import competition, presented in Table 1, is not
2
free from limitations. Nevertheless, the typical ranking of the
sample countries is revealed once again. Although Chile had
An astounding turnaround in public sector accounts was reported
at the beginning of the 1990s [EIU, a]. However, the drastic
reduction of deficits in Brazil was largely achieved through
the accumulation of arrears on the external debt and the defer-
ment of internal debt service [see also Ohana, Mussi, 1991].
Hence, fiscal consolidation is not sustainable and suffers from
low credibility.
2
Large countries typically reveal a lower level of import pene-
tration than smaller countries. Because of this large country
bias, the subsequent interpretation is restricted to the change
of the applied indicator.- 17 -
opened up to world market competition in the 1970s already,
import penetration continued to rise until recently. The Mexican
reforms had a similar effect, though from a seriously depressed
level of imports after the outbreak of the debt crisis. In sharp
contrast, the isolation of Brazil from import competition became
even more pronounced during the 1980s, which is reflected in the
declining share of imports in GDP.
Risk perceptions: In Section II, the debt-service ratio was used
as a proxy for sovereign risk since default becomes more likely,
the more resources could be saved in this way. According to this
reasoning, sovereign risk has declined significantly for all four
debtor countries. In 1990, the debt-service ratios were roughly
halved as compared to 1983-85. However, this picture conceals
important differences. The improvement started much earlier in
Chile than elsewhere. More importantly, the improvement was due
to voluntary and market-based debt reduction operations. The same
applies to Mexico, which recently agreed with its private credi-
tors on an effective gross bank debt reduction of US$ 15 billion.
Together with appropriate economic policies, mutually agreed debt
relief operations have reduced debt overhang concerns in the case
of Chile and Mexico [El-Erian, 1991]. This is clearly reflected
by the secondary market notations for Chilean and Mexican debt
paper. Chile outperformed all other sample countries by far.
Secondary market discounts reached a maximum of 45 per cent in
1988, as compared to 80-90 per cent for Brazil and Argentina.
Recently, the notation of Chilean debt paper approached its face
value. The notation for Mexico, which was down to about 40 per
cent of face value in the late 1980s, recovered quickly when the
Mexican government regained credibility through sustaining econo-
mic reforms and the comprehensive restructuring of bank debt took
place.
Recently, the Brazilian government liberalized import regula-
tions especially for industrial inputs [Funke, Nunnenkamp,
Schweickert, 1992]. But the sustainability of trade liberaliza-
tion is threatened as long as the domestic currency is over-
valued in real terms (Table 1).- 18 -
Notwithstanding declining debt-service ratios, the risk percep-
tions of foreign capital suppliers continued to be rather un-
favorable in the case of Argentina, and even more so in Brazil.
This is not surprising since the improvement of debt indicators
was largely due to non-cooperative debt policies, in particular
the accumulation of huge interest arrears since 1988. Consequent-
ly, secondary market notations were dramatically below Chilean
and Mexican standards in 1990. Subsequently, the notation of
Argentine debt paper responded favorably to the sudden turnaround
of economic policies in early 1991. Brazil's agreement on inter-
est arrears with commercial banks in May 1991 resulted in slight-
ly higher secondary market notations. But the country's rating
fell considerably behind Argentina. This relative decline points
to continued uncertainty of foreign capital suppliers with
respect to Brazil's economic policy course in the future.
In summary, all major elements of the "attractiveness portfolio"
considered above support the proposition that domestic policy
reforms and cooperative debt strategies contributed significantly
to better economic performance and helped to overcome unfavorable
risk perceptions of foreign capital suppliers. What remains to be
evaluated is whether these achievements translated into better
access to international capital markets.
2. Access to International Capital Markets
After international capital markets had been a major source of
external financing for Latin America until the early 1980s, the
outbreak of the debt crisis resulted in a virtual drying up of
all major sources of voluntary financing. It was only recently
that several Latin American borrowers regained limited access to
voluntary financing from international capital markets [Funke,
Nunnenkamp, Schweickert, 1992]. Scattered evidence suggests that
credit rationing has been relaxed for Chile, Mexico and Venezuela
in the first place [El-Erian, 1991]:
- Chile used trade and project financing as a major source of
external funding in 1989-90. The loan of US$ 20 million raised- 19 -
by Chile in September 1990 was reported to be the first fully
voluntary, unsecured general bank loan to a Latin American
country since 1982.
- International bond markets became an important source of volun-
tary financing for Mexico (and Venezuela). In the period Janu-
ary 1990 - March 1992, Mexico raised US$ 3.2 billion on these
markets [World Bank, 1992]. The relaxation of rationing has
been accompanied with significantly reduced risk premiums for
Mexican bond issues [El-Erian, 1991]. The improved credit-
worthiness of selected borrowers is revealed by the drastic
fall of spreads over US government bonds from 530-820 basic
points in mid-1989 to 200-250 basic points two years later.
- A remarkable turnaround occurred with regard to capital flight.
In the case of Mexico, is has been estimated that capital re-
patriation exceeded US$ 10 billion in 1989-90, while outflows
of US$ 18 billion had been recorded during the period 1983-88.
Repatriation continued in early 1991 [Lustig, 1991].
Comprehensive and consistent data on net resource flows to Latin
American debtor countries are difficult to obtain on a current
basis. However, the available evidence reveals significant dif-
ferences between the four sample countries (Table 2). Total net
resource flows in per cent of GNP were significantly higher in
Chile than elsewhere immediately after the outbreak of the debt
crisis. Resource flows to Chile declined slightly during the
second half of the 1980s, but more than doubled in 1990. In rela-
tive terms, Chile outperformed its neighboring countries through-
out the period under consideration. Though the recovery of total
net resource flows started from a seriously depressed level in
Subsequently, the focus is on net resource flows rather than
net transfers, i.e., interest payments are not subtracted from
(gross) disbursements. In contrast to Section II, it would be
strongly misleading to concentrate on net transfers as an indi-
cator for the access to voluntary external financing in recent
years. This is because net transfers are heavily influenced by
the accumulation of interest arrears in the case of Argentina
and Brazil.- 20 -
Table 2 - Net Resource Flows to Major Latin American Debtor Coun-





























































































































































Period averages. - In parentheses: in per cent of GNP. -
 C Not comparable
to other figures in the table; includes short- and long-term capital flows,
unrequited official transfers, and errors and omissions; 1991: preliminary-
estimates •
Source: World Bank [1991a; 1992]; ECLAC [1991].- 21 -
Mexico, the figures for this country clearly indicate a much more
favorable development of international creditworthiness as com-
pared to Argentina and Brazil. Also the comparison of the latter
two countries reveals the by now well-known ranking. The contrac-
tion of net resource flows was most pronounced in Brazil, which
remained the only country suffering from negative net resource
flows in 1989-90.
For all four countries, total net resource flows mainly consisted
of debt flows in the early 1980s. Hence, it is not surprising
that the development of net debt flows largely resembles the
picture on total flows. The only noteworthy difference is that
Argentina's position was not better than Brazil's position. As
shown before, both countries had accumulated huge interest
arrears. The drastic change of economic policy in Argentina
occurred only in early 1991 and was not anticipated by external
creditors. The figures on private non-guaranteed debt indicate
that the reversal of capital flows after the outbreak of the
crisis was mainly due to the drastically changed lending behavior
of international commercial banks. Furthermore, the banks were
more reluctant to resume lending on a non-guaranteed basis imme-
diately after economic reforms had been implemented. This applies
to Mexico in particular. Though their favorable response was
sometimes delayed, the banks honored internal adjustment efforts
of debtor countries by relaxing the rationing of private non-
guaranteed debt. In 1990, access to this type of external finance
appeared no longer to be a problem for Chile, and Mexico's cre-
ditworthiness was considerably improved. Negative flows of non-
guaranteed debt were again restricted to Brazil.
The favorable consequences of internal policy reforms on the
access to external financing were most pronounced with regard to
foreign direct investment flows. FDI stagnated in Brazil, which
had traditionally been the favorite location of foreign investors
in Latin America. In per cent of GNP, Brazil suffered from a
serious decline of FDI. This was in sharp contrast to the other
three countries:- 22 -
- Though the absolute figures continued to be relatively small,
FDI increased steadily in Chile throughout the 1980s.
- Economic reforms in Mexico triggered a quick response by for-
eign investors. Recently, the NAFTA agreement provided a fur-
ther stimulus to FDI flows to this country. In 1991, Mexico
attracted net FDI flows of an amount that matched the aggregate
figure for the three other countries and was about ten times
the annual flows to Mexico in 1983-85.
- Foreign investors responded favorably to the more recent re-
forms in Argentina as well. In the early 1990s, net FDI flows
more than doubled the amount reported for 1989.
All in all, the available evidence strongly supports the earlier
proposition that policy reforms and cooperative debt strategies
not only result in better economic performance, but also help
considerably to regain access to voluntary external financing.
V. Summary and Conclusions
Inflows of foreign capital continue to be required to fully ex-
ploit the growth potential of major Latin American debtor coun-
tries. The basic hypothesis of this paper was that domestic poli-
cy reforms and cooperative debt strategies are best suited to
break out of the vicious circle of economic decline or stagnation
and impaired attractiveness for foreign capital. This proposition
remained heavily disputed even after the crucial role of domestic
economic policies in determining whether foreign debt became
unmanageable had been firmly established in empirical analyses.
Cross-country estimates on the determinants of foreign capital
inflows in the aftermath of the debt crisis clarified the ongoing
discussion in several respects:- 23 -
- Private creditors honored favorable policies by easing the
access to international credit markets. However, narrowly de-
fined adjustment measures were an insufficient condition for a
resumption of bank lending when private lenders perceived seri-
ous sovereign risks to persist.
- Foreign investors responded to policy induced distortions and
transfer risks in a similar way as private lenders. Consequent-
ly, the chances of debt-ridden countries to restructure their
external financing remained limited at best unless the attrac-
tiveness for debt and FDI inflows was restored.
The requirements to regain access to international capital mar-
kets were particularly difficult to be fulfilled by Latin Ameri-
can countries, the creditworthiness and credibility of which had
been seriously eroded. In view of these difficulties, major deb-
tors were fairly reluctant to revise their economic policies in a
comprehensive and consistent manner. Sustained internal adjust-
ment efforts combined with cooperative debt policies were largely
restricted to Chile over much of the period under consideration.
Brazil represented the best example of a persistent muddling-
through approach and protracted confrontation with its creditors.
Mexico, and most recently also Argentina, changed policy course
and initiated comprehensive reform packages after their earlier
reaction to the debt crisis had largely resembled the Brazilian
strategy.
Arguably, the change in domestic policies and debt strategies in
Mexico and Argentina was encouraged by Chile's relative success
in terms of economic performance and access to external finan-
cing. Throughout the 1980s, Chile outperformed the less reform-
minded neighboring countries with respect to GDP growth, the
recovery of private investment, and world market performance.
Macroeconomic stability was maintained. The risk perceptions of
foreign capital suppliers were alleviated tremendously so that
the secondary market notations of Chilean debt paper approached
its face value. These achievements had as a consequence that- 24 -
credit rationing was significantly less severe in Chile than
elsewhere. Furthermore, FDI inflows increased steadily during the
1980s.
When economic policy reforms followed suit in Mexico in 1987,
similarly favorable consequences could be observed. Economic
growth and private investment picked up, macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion was impressive, and mutually agreed debt relief operations
resulted in improved risk perceptions. Due to the restoration of
the government's credibility, Mexico regained access to inter-
national capital markets at a significant scale. Bond issues
became an important source of voluntary external financing, and
the country benefited from a boom in FDI.
It is still too early to reach a definite conclusion on the out-
come of the more recent reforms in Argentina. However, prelimina-
ry evidence on the country's "attractiveness portfolio" and the
reaction of foreign capital suppliers suggest that Argentina
might become another telling example for the usefulness of in-
ternal policy reforms. Shortly after the policy change, Argentina
surpassed Brazil in terms of economic performance, risk percep-
tions, and access to foreign capital markets. Brazil represented
the tail-light of the four major Latin American debtor countries
in nearly all respects. Economic growth proved to be unsustain-
able, export market shares declined steadily, and macroeconomic
instability remained unchecked. Hence, it is not surprising that
foreign capital suppliers remained concerned about sovereign risk
and were reluctant to relax credit constraints and channel more
investment funds to Brazil.
In summary, the analysis reveals a nearly perfect correspondence
between the degree of reform-mindedness and the attractiveness of
major debtor countries for foreign capital. Furthermore, economic
performance indicators and capital inflows responded fairly
quickly to domestic policy reforms and cooperative solutions to
persistent payment problems. These results should encourage coun-
tries such as Argentina, which initiated comprehensive reforms- 25 -
recently, to stay on course. Countries such as Brazil, which are
still lagging behind with regard to economic adjustment, are well
advised to follow suit. Otherwise, these countries will be the
first candidates which cannot stand the fiercer worldwide compe-
tition for foreign capital in the 1990s. Adjustment pessimism is
not justified on the ground that the benefits of domestic policy
reforms will be reaped by the country's foreign creditors exclu-
sively. To the contrary, it is mainly the debtor country that
benefits in terms of improved economic performance and easier
access to international capital markets.- 26 -
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